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Abstract
This article presents new data on provisions for police reform in peace agreements (PRPA) between 1975 and 2011.
The PRPA dataset complements past research on the determinants and effects of specific terms in agreements with
detailed data on police reform provisions. The PRPA dataset also adds a quantitative dimension to the thus far largely
qualitative literature on post-conflict security sector reform (SSR). It includes information on six subtypes of police
reform: capacity, training, human rights standards, accountability, force composition and international training and
monitoring. We show that there is currently a high global demand for the regulation of police reform through peace
agreements: police reform provisions are now more regularly included in agreements than settlement terms that call
for power-sharing or elections. We observe interesting variations in the inclusion of police reform provisions in
relation to past human rights violations, regime type, or the scope of international peacekeeping prior to negotiations,
and illustrate the implications of police reform provisions for the duration of post-conflict peace. Finally, we
stimulate ideas on how scholars and policymakers can use the PRPA dataset in future to study new questions on
post-conflict police reform.
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Introduction
Establishing a well-functioning and legitimate police
force as part of a wider security sector reform (SSR)
process is one of the most vital components of post-
conflict peacebuilding (Call, 2002; Brzoska, 2006;
Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014). There are a number of
reasons for this. The police force represents the most
important provider of internal security in post-conflict
states, particularly after international peacekeepers have
left and national military forces have relinquished
responsibility for handling internal policing tasks
(Downie, 2013). Further, if dysfunctional or illegitimate
institutional structures underpinning the police contrib-
uted to the onset of war in the first place, reform is
crucial to ensure that these deficiencies do not fuel a
relapse to violence in the post-conflict period. Lastly, if
officers were themselves perpetrators of violence during
the conflict, reform is an important part of restoring trust
in the police and, ultimately, creating a legitimate post-
conflict state (cf. Goldsmith, 2005).
At the same time, police forces in post-conflict states
are frequently ill-equipped, lack basic training in human
rights, and are asymmetrically constituted in terms of
ethnic groups or warring parties. Consequently, large
volumes of development finance are now being targeted
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at training police officers after war, as well as at embed-
ding them in legitimate political structures (OECD,
2007). But despite a vibrant qualitative debate in the
post-conflict SSR and peacebuilding literature on the
determinants and effects of police reform, systematic and
comparative evidence on the demand for, as well as the
impact of, such reform in the areas of equipment,
accountability structures, and force composition is still
lacking. This is also due to the paucity of available quan-
titative data.
In this article, we introduce the Police Reform in
Peace Agreements (PRPA) dataset to help narrow this
gap, contributing to existing research on peace accords
and SSR. Quantitative studies of peace agreements have
predominantly focused the causes and effects of political
dimensions of peace settlements, such as power-sharing
between warring parties. While data collections also
include information on aspects of the broader security
sector context, such as provisions for military power-
sharing (Ottmann & Vu¨llers, 2015), transitional justice
(Binningsbø et al., 2012), or demobilization, disarma-
ment and reintegration (DDR) (Harbom, Ho¨gbladh &
Wallensteen, 2006), the police is neglected in this line of
research. This is surprising, as agreements represent
important blueprints for post-conflict police reform.
In contrast, the study of police reform has been much
more prominent in a growing qualitative literature on
the role of SSR in peace processes (Ha¨nggi, 2004;
Brzoska, 2006). Researchers have identified several vital
‘ingredients’ to the reform of the police: it is widely
accepted that police reform is not only a technical exer-
cise of training officers and building police posts, but also
a deeply political process (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003;
Bernabe´u, 2007). Political dimensions to police reform
include, among other things, issues of control and com-
position. Research has here stressed the need to build
political accountability structures, such as parliamentary
oversight committees (O’Neill, 2005). Brzoska & Hei-
nemann-Gru¨der (2004) also identify an ‘ethnic balance’
within the post-conflict police force as fundamental.
Others highlight that human rights training is central
to improving the job performance of officers and reduc-
ing police brutality (Bajraktari et al., 2006). Finally,
existing case study research has highlighted the signifi-
cant international involvement in post-conflict police
reform and pointed to the need for local participation
and leadership for these international projects to be suc-
cessful (Donais, 2009).
The PRPA dataset complements these studies’ small-
N focus. It represents a first quantitative assessment of
how peace agreements address the various technical,
political and international facets of post-conflict police
reform described in the qualitative literature. Our dataset
enables scholars and practitioners to systematically exam-
ine whether case study findings can be generalized to a
wider set of cases or whether they remain context-
specific. It allows future research to explore relationships
between aspects of police reform in agreements, their
determinants, and their impact on post-conflict human
rights practices, peace and political developments.
Defining and measuring police reform as part
of peace agreements
We understand the police as the government agency that
is tasked with maintaining internal public security and
order, as well as with preventing and investigating crim-
inal activities. Embedded in past research, we refer to
reform as a change in the institutional structure of the
police with respect to three dimensions: their technical
capability (changes in the training and equipping of offi-
cers), political aspects (addressing human rights standards,
composition and accountability structures) and interna-
tional elements (modifications made under international
monitoring and training).
Our unit of observation is the peace agreement. For
each agreement, we collect data on nine variables which
jointly cover the three dimensions (see Table I). A
dummy variable indicates whether a given provision was
present or not.1 Peace accords are defined as pacts con-
cerned with the resolution of the core incompatibility
underpinning an intrastate armed conflict and signed
by the key actors engaged in such conflict (cf. Kreutz,
2010). We follow the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) and define armed conflict as ‘a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or terri-
tory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’. To
delineate our sample we rely on the UCDP Peace Agree-
ment Dataset (Ho¨gbladh, 2011), but given our focus on
police forces as internal providers of security, we narrow
our focus to those 196 accords in the dataset concluded
after intrastate conflict had ended. To ease merging the
PRPA dataset with previous data collections on peace
accords, we include identifying variables from the
UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset in our dataset – the
UCDP peace agreement ID, name and date, as well as
1 With this binary coding we cannot capture any degrees or strength
of different aspects of police reform. These limitations in degree are
compensated by the conceptual range of our ten variables.
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the conflict ID from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset v.4-2013 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themne´r &
Wallensteen, 2013). Since we do not code the imple-
mentation of reform provisions, users of the data need to
be cautious about conclusions regarding the implemen-
tation of provisions. Accord provisions nevertheless offer
useful information about the parties’ intentions regard-
ing police reforms or may be interpreted as costly signals
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Mattes & Savun, 2009).
Our main sources of information for the coding pro-
cess were the agreement texts, as provided in the UCDP
Peace Agreement Dataset. We extracted those passages
that explicitly addressed the police and its reform and
categorized them according to several dimensions of
reform. We decided for positive coding only in cases
where the police were specifically mentioned. For ambig-
uous references, for example if the accord called for
reforming ‘security institutions’ without explicitly stating
whether this would also concern the police or not, we
examined previous agreements signed as part of the peace
process. In those instances where these previous
agreements clearly stated that the police force is part of
those security institutions, we opted for positive coding.2
We trained research assistants to conduct an initial
round of coding. Every coding was then independently
recoded by one of the principal investigators. We then
repeated this procedure and all codings were again revised
by a different principal investigator than in the first round.
When codings for a case were changed in both rounds of
revision, we flagged this as an uncertain case in the dataset,
a total of eight peace agreements (4% of all agreements).3
Table I. Variables coded in the PRPA dataset
Variable Operationalization
Number of
occurrences
Coded 1 if the peace agreement contains any provisions that regulate . . .
Technical dimension
Capacity . . . the state of the force’s technical and professional equipment. This includes the
availability of arms, ammunitions, clothing, number of personnel and their place(s) of
deployment.
60
Training . . . the tactical and/or professional education of members of the police force, including
rule of law and human rights training.
36
Political dimension
Human rights . . . the conduct of the police force on the basis of internationally accepted human rights
norms.
14
Accountability . . . formal governmental control over the national police force, including provisions that
determine the authority to which the police force must answer and that takes
responsibility for overseeing officers’ conduct.
38
Composition (All) . . . the mode of representation of groups (ethnic groups, women, former warring
parties, etc.) in the police force.
23
Composition:
Gender
. . . the composition of the police force on the basis of gender. 4
Composition:
Identity
. . . the composition of the police force on the basis of a person’s affiliation to a particular
identity group, especially to a cultural and/or religious one.
11
Composition:
Warring parties
. . . the police’s composition on the basis of a person’s affiliation to a former party to the
conflict.
23
International
dimension
International
monitoring
. . . if one or more international actors are mandated to systematically keep track of
police activities and provide information about these activities to all stakeholders and/
or mandated to improve the tactical and/or professional education of members of the
police force, including human rights and rule of law training.
30
All variables were coded 1 if the respective regulation was present in a peace agreement and 0 otherwise.
2 This only concerned five agreements in three countries: Burundi,
Nepal and Liberia. For details on these cases and sources used, see the
Online appendix.
3 Note that this does not mean that the same coding was changed
twice, but different variable codings might have changed (for
instance, ‘capacity’ was changed by principal investigator A in the
first round and ‘human rights training’ was changed by principal
investigator B in the second round). We nevertheless flag this
variable, as we take the repeated change of codings within an
observation as indicative of imprecise wording in the source
document.
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Types of police reform provisions in peace
agreements
The PRPA dataset includes information on three dimen-
sions of police reform provisions – a technical, a political
and an international dimension – by coding several
subtypes.
Technical dimensions of police reform
Technical aspects of police reform, such as training offi-
cers in investigative procedures, were prioritized partic-
ularly in the early 1990s (DCAF, 2009). Loh argues it is
essential to improve police capacity ‘as quickly as possi-
ble’ in a peace process to bridge the gap between citizens’
needs and the force’s ability to meet these needs (2010:
6). The PRPA dataset assesses technical dimensions of
police reform in two variables. First, we collect data on
how accords include provisions to strengthen police
capacity, defined as the state of their technical and pro-
fessional equipment, including the availability of arms,
clothing, the size of the force and its place of deploy-
ment. For instance, the Protocol on Redeployment in
Hebron, concluded between Israel and Palestine, states
that ‘Palestinian police stations or posts will be [ . . . ]
manned by a total of up to 400 policemen, equipped
with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols’. Second, we
code whether an accord called for the training of the police
in technical skills – understood as tactical or professional
education of officers. One example of an accord addres-
sing this aspect is the Erdut Agreement for Croatia,
which states that the transitional authority ‘shall help
to establish and train temporary police forces, to build
professionalism among the police, and confidence
among all ethnic communities’.
Political dimensions of police reform
While technical aspects of police reform were strongly
endorsed in peace efforts immediately after 1989, the
emergence of liberal peacebuilding in the 1990s gave rise
to a new emphasis on the political aspects of such reform
(DCAF, 2009). The PRPA dataset collects information
on three distinct types of political police reform in peace
accords. First, one of the central components of police
reform today is to ensure that officers operate with a
respect for human rights. If provisions on the latter are
not included in accords, police reform risks being coun-
terproductive by ‘reinforcing perceptions that human
rights are of little relevance to actual police work’ (Cor-
done, 2000: 206). The PRPA dataset includes a variable
capturing how accords address human rights standards for
the police, meaning provisions that regulate the conduct
of officers on the basis of internationally accepted human
rights. For instance, El Salvador’s Chapultepec Peace
Agreement states that the police ‘shall preserve and
defend the human rights of all persons’ and prohibits
‘any act of torture’ by the police.
Second, we collect information on how accords help
regulate police accountability, which we refer to as provi-
sions that determine the supervisory authority to which
the police force must report. O’Neill (2005: 9), for
example, stresses that police reform will not succeed
without a ‘heavy emphasis on police accountability’ and
oversight bodies that prosecute officers for professional
misconduct. For instance, Sudan’s Darfur Peace Agree-
ment of 2010 includes provisions for the civil oversight
and legal accountability of local police forces.
Third, we collect information on how peace agree-
ments address a police force’s composition, which we
understand as terms that adjust the representation of
socially or politically relevant groups within the police
force. The significance of representation is recognized in
the broader SSR literature, which highlights the need for
implementing context-driven reforms in order to consti-
tute the police force as a ‘mirror of society at large’
(Bastick, 2007: 13). We code an overall composition
variable which captures if any quotas were called for in
the accord. We additionally distinguish between accords
that provide for reform of the representation of warring
parties, ethnic or religious identity groups and women.
Examples include the accords signed by Angola’s govern-
ment and the Unia˜o Nacional para a Independeˆncia
Total de Angola (UNITA) in 1991, 1994 and 2002,
which regulate the representation of UNITA combatants
in the police force and specify the ranks that are to be
filled by ex-combatants.
International dimensions of police reform
Qualitative studies have often critically examined the
role of international actors in police reform processes
(Call, 2002). At the same time, studies also recognize
that circumstances of political instability often require
strong international leadership in police reform (Bajrak-
tari et al., 2006). The PRPA dataset assesses whether
international roles in such reform procedures are
already negotiated in peace accords, and we collect
information on whether agreements called for the inter-
national monitoring and training of the police, such as
by peacekeeping troops. For instance, the 2003 Linas-
Marcoussis Peace Accords in Ivory Coast called for the
monitoring of the police force by United Nations (UN)
peacekeepers.
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Trends and patterns of police reform in
peace agreements
Police reform provisions in peace agreements are not
equally distributed across time, while the distinct dimen-
sions and subtypes of such provisions vary in frequency
of occurrence. Of the 196 accords included in our sam-
ple, 78 (almost 40%) include provisions for police
reform. To put this number into perspective, the widely
studied issues of power-sharing and elections occur
much less frequently: only 24 of the 217 accords in the
UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset include terms for polit-
ical power-sharing and only 69 accords call for elections
or electoral reform.
Another insight from the PRPA dataset is that police
reform provisions have become an increasingly frequent
phenomenon since 1989 (see Figure 1). Of the 14
accords signed before 1989, only four (or 28.6%) call
for police reform in some way; meanwhile, 40.9% (74
out of 181) of accords signed after 1989 call for such
reform. This growing trend becomes even more visible
when we illustrate the percentage of accords per year that
include police reform provisions, that has steadily
increased over time (see Figure 2).
Our data also show a large variation in terms of how
extensively and in what manner police reform is dealt
with in peace accords (see Table I). Provisions related to
reforming capacity appear most often, with 60 of 78
accords addressing reform. The aspect of training is
included in 36 accords. This reflects that police reform
is mostly approximated as a technical exercise, as
provisions for capacity typically regulate the recruitment
of officers or the types of arms they are permitted to
carry.
While technical aspects dominate, many agreements
do address political aspects of police reform. Reforming
accountability structures and a force’s composition are
addressed frequently in our sample. Nearly half of those
accords that address police reform in some fashion (38
accords) deal with (re-)modelling accountability struc-
tures for the police. A further 34 accords include provi-
sions designed to regulate the composition of the police.
Most often (23 of 34 accords), the aim is to address the
representation of warring parties. In contrast, quotas for
female police officers are hardly recognized despite being
high on the international agenda (Mobekk, 2010). Only
four accords in Burundi, El Salvador, Rwanda and Sudan
address gender-sensitive policing.
Context and implications of police reforms in
peace agreements
In this section we present potential applications of our
dataset, concentrating on preliminary, descriptive
insights rather than exhaustive empirical analyses, which
we leave to future research. We focus on two approaches:
factors that explain why parties address police reform in
peace accords – reform provisions being the dependent
variable – and the effects of police reform provisions on
post-conflict outcomes – reform being the independent
variable.
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Figure 1. Trends in police reform provisions, 1975–2011
Solid line: peace agreements (PAs) with provisions for police reform; grey/dashed line: total number of PAs.
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Explaining police reform in peace agreements
To explore potential context conditions of police reform
in peace agreements, we use data on a range of covariates.
We then model the relationship between these covariates
and the occurrence of police reform provisions using a
simple logit analysis. This is an exploratory exercise only;
our logit model merely serves as a concise way to sum-
marize the probabilistic relationship between context
covariates and police reform. Summarizing the data this
way has the additional benefit of separating out the indi-
vidual influence of each variable while controlling for the
confounding of other variables. We explicitly refrain
from making causal claims regarding these covariates.
Role of police during conflict. If, during armed con-
flict, the police played a role as perpetrator of human
rights violations, rebels should be more likely to urge a
government to include police reform provisions in peace
agreements. We combine data from the PRPA dataset
and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) to explore variations
in political terror across post-conflict cases (Gibney et al.,
2015). We calculate a five-year average PTS score prior
to an agreement.4
Security apparatus. We assume that police reform
should be more likely to be addressed when the reform
of the overall security apparatus is an issue in negotia-
tions. We use DDR provisions as an approximation for
how security topics arise during peace negotiations and
include a dummy variable for DDR provisions in peace
accords, taken from the original UCDP Peace Agree-
ment Dataset.
Political environment. As authoritarian regimes often
rely on the police as an instrument of repression, police
reform in post-authoritarian contexts faces a number of
obstacles – such as the potential unwillingness of a gov-
ernment to shed light on its police force’s involvement in
past crimes (Goldsmith, 2005). Negotiations involving
authoritarian regimes should thus be less likely to address
police reform. We use Freedom House (FH) scores in
the year the agreement was signed to proxy regime type,
ranging from 1 (very democratic) to 7 (very autocratic).
Conflict issue. Does it make a difference whether the
conflict was fought over government or over territory for
the subsequent inclusion of police reform provisions in
accords? We rely on data from the UCDP to distinguish
government and territorial conflicts (Ho¨gbladh, 2011).
International context. The occurrence of large-scale
police training programs funded by Western donors in
places such as Afghanistan or Liberia suggests that post-
conflict police reform is heavily shaped by international
involvement. We include data on the mandate of the UN
peacekeeping mission deployed to the country one year
Figure 2. Share of peace agreements with police provisions, 1975–2011
Trend line corresponds to linear regression of percentage on year.
4 PTS scores range from 1 (secure rule of law and freedom of
expression) to 5 (terror has expanded to the whole population,
large-scale human rights violations), see Gibney et al. (2015).
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prior to the signature of the agreement to measure the
level of UN involvement in the peacemaking process.5
Figure 3 summarizes the results of our exploratory
analysis.6 The positive coefficient for the PTS score indi-
cates that agreements include police reform provisions
when there were higher average levels of prior human
rights violations. This pattern seems indeed to be driven
by concrete human rights violations rather than merely
reflecting conflict intensity: no clear relationship between
conflict intensity and police reform is apparent.7 We also
find that police reform provisions become more likely
when DDR is addressed within a peace agreement. This
suggests that conflict parties tend to regulate police reform
together with the broader security apparatus.
While we observe more conflicts over government to
occur in general, police reform provisions are more likely
after territorial conflicts. One explanation for this pattern
could be that arrangements made following territorial
conflicts often include devolution of authority that
might then be reflected in provisions that call for a
restructuring of the police force. We further find that
more autocratic countries with higher FH scores are less
likely to include police reform provisions in peace agree-
ments. Finally, while the majority of agreements did not
see the deployment of a peacekeeping mission prior to
the signature of the accord (many operations are only
deployed as a result of an agreement), those cases that do
see a strongly mandated mission are more likely to
include police reform provisions in the peace agreement.
We do not interpret these patterns as a causal relation-
ship, but believe that this correlational evidence prompts
new and interesting research questions: what, for exam-
ple, is the precise relationship between the role of police
forces during war and their reform after war if we go
beyond using PTS scores?
Police reform provisions and the survival of peace
The PRPA dataset could also help address further
research questions that treat police reform provisions as
the independent variable. Several scholars have studied
how terms of peace accords affect commitment problems
Political terror scale (1−5)
(5-year average prior to PA)
Conflict intensity
(dummy)
DDR provision in PA
(dummy)
Territorial conflict
(dummy)
Freedom House (1−7)
(in year of PA)
UN: Traditional /
observer mission
(dummy variable; 1 year prior to PA)
UN: Enforcement /
 multidimensional mission
(dummy variable; 1 year prior to PA)
0 1 2
Figure 3. Context conditions of police provisions in peace
agreements
Logit coefficients with 90% confidence intervals are based on stan-
dard errors clustered by conflict ID.
5 Data on peacekeeping are taken from an updated version of the
original Doyle & Sambanis (2006) data by Hegre, Hultman &
Nygård (2011). We follow Doyle & Sambanis in creating three
dummy variables that denote no peacekeeping mission, missions
with a weak mandate (traditional and observer missions) and a
strong mandate (multidimensional and enforcement missions). The
variable corresponds to Doyle & Sambanis’s unops variable (2006:
Online appendix).
6 See the Online appendix for the full results table as well as
substantive effects plots.
7 To capture conflict intensity, we construct a measure of battle-
related deaths per month. Data on battle-related deaths and
conflict start and end dates are taken from UCDP (2013) for dates
after 1989. For agreements concluded prior to 1989, data are taken
from the PRIO Battle Deaths dataset 3.0 (Lacina &Gleditsch, 2005).
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of warring parties and shape the survival of post-conflict
peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Mattes & Savun,
2009). Qualitative research has pointed out that police
reform can be a tool by which to mitigate commitment
problems, as the police represent the primary institution
enforcing the authority of a state in the everyday lives of
citizens (Powell, 2014).
The PRPA dataset enables scholars to statistically test
the assumptions about the effects of police reform made
in qualitative research. We may theorize that political
provisions for reform represent a more credible signal for
peace, as opposed to technical reforms. We selected the
57 full peace accords in our sample and aggregated the
subtypes of reform provisions to a political provisions and
a technical provisions dummy.8 We then estimated the
survival of peace as the number of days peace lasted
between the signing date of the accord (taken from the
UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset) and the recurrence of
armed conflict, using data from the PSED Dataset (Ott-
mann & Vu¨llers, 2015) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset. If a case had no recurrence of conflict,
we right-censored it at 31 December 2011.
We illustrate the relationship between political and
technical reform provisions and post-conflict peace by
plotting Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival probabil-
ities of peace in Figures 4 and 5.9 These curves show that
while the inclusion of technical provisions does not seem
to be related to the survival of peace, agreements that
stipulate political provisions for police reform show a
higher survival probability than those that did not
inscribe political provisions. Log rank tests show that the
difference between the curves of accords with political
provisions and those without such provisions is statisti-
cally significant at p < 0.05, while no such relationship
exists for accords including technical reforms. More the-
oretical reasoning is required to study why this relation-
ship may come about, especially controlling for any
confounding variables that affect both the inclusion of
police reforms in agreements and the carrying out of
police reform. The PRPA dataset provides an apt empiri-
cal basis from which to address this and similar
questions.
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Figure 4. Technical police reform provisions and the survival of peace
8 Political provisions are those coded 1 in the accountability, human
rights and/or composition dimensions. Technical provisions refer to
terms coded 1 in the capacity and/or training dimensions.
9 Right-censoring the data implies that cases are still peaceful on 31
December 2011 – even though they may have had an overall low
duration time. Hence, the plots do not reflect that police reforms
have become more frequent in recent times, but they show the
difference between agreements with or without specific reforms.
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Discussion and outlook
The PRPA dataset represents the first attempt to quan-
tify the occurrence and dimensions of police reform pro-
visions in peace agreements, complementing the large
qualitative literature on post-conflict security sector
reform. It offers a starting point to analyze both the
conditions under which parties agree to include police
reform in peace accords and the impact of police reform
on different post-conflict outcomes. The possible appli-
cations sketched in the previous sections cannot infer any
causal relationships. Rather, they should be regarded as
preliminary insights that point to a large variety of poten-
tial future research opportunities for scholars from dif-
ferent disciplinary backgrounds which the PRPA dataset
can help answer.
For instance, scholars interested in questions of inter-
national peacebuilding could use the PRPA dataset to
more systematically explore links between the footprint
of the international deployment and various aspects of
domestic police reform processes, a topic that has only
been addressed in qualitative research so far (e.g. Berna-
be´u, 2007). Scholars working in the fields of criminology
or sociology might want to use the PRPA dataset to study
whether different aspects of police reform shape post-
conflict outcomes beyond the stability of peace, such
as societal trust in police forces. Academics with an area
studies perspective could use the PRPA dataset to explore
regional patterns of police reform, and investigate
whether African contexts call for different types of police
reform than Latin American or Asian contexts, especially
if we consider colonial legacies. Methodologically, scho-
lars could also use the PRPA dataset to select qualitative
case studies: as mixed-methods research becomes an
increasingly used analytic instrument in the social
sciences, the PRPA dataset will allow scholars to con-
sciously select cases based on reliable and standardized
criteria.
In addition to possible empirical and methodological
applications, we also make a conceptual contribution:
the typology of different police reform dimensions pre-
sented in this article could be adapted to study police
reforms in non-post-conflict situations. This would
allow scholars to compare the respective importance of
police reform across different processes of transition, for
example autocracy-to-democracy and war-to-peace tran-
sitions. We also inform the policy debate about external
SSR support as funding agencies can use the data to infer
where and under what conditions which types of post-
conflict police reform are likely and where which type of
funding might become necessary in the future.
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Replication data
The dataset, codebook and replication scripts for the
empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online
appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/data-
sets. All analyses were conducted in R 3.2.1.
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